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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J~

DUCT ION

·r·.1
:..~-,:~1-r_""

I \ T' ION,

o. .1t , : :

c\ppe>l lant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
MILO W. AND CLEOWN WATTS

15.

1

i'AT~'S,

~t·~dants,

Case No. 19380

al.,

~t

Respondents.
NATURE OF THE CASE

T~1s

action was in the nature of a foreclosure brought

·.1tn•:ff appellant, Utah Farm Production Credit Association,
and hereafter called PCA

··"T,r,00.:

.. ,.
J

'·~spondents

on four promissory notes

called Watts) and one Buford L.

:.121beth A. Gregory (referred to as Gregorys hereafter).
;n the action were Agricultural Stablization and

co~ea

Service, Commodity Credit Corporation, Scott

·c·o'.V~t1on

~r,s"n,

'"ul
-.

I hereinafter

>

r

and Ron Burns, dba Stephenson

F~rtn1ng,

~ortgagees

&

Burns Pump Service,

dba Paul Farthing Grading Contractor, who were

or lien claimants on the subject property.

Respondents crossclaimed against Gregorys on a Uniform
· " >t·3 ··ontract covering 481 acres sold by Watls to Gregorys,
~r~d
. ,.- l

a portion of the land included in the mortgage upon
'

"•urr

sought foreclosure .

In addition PCA attempted to

c)[ted security interest in equipment and crops

pursuant to a security agreement executed July 18, 1978, by ,,,,
Watts and Gregorys.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Watts take serious issue with PCA's Statement of
Disposition in Lower Court and assert that the "Partial Summan
Judgment" alluded to in PCA's said statement was only an
acknowledgment or admission on the part of both Watts and

Gregor'.·

that the promissory notes being sued on by PCA had in fact

been

signed by the respective parties and a ruling of the court that
such fact was established.

PCA' s assertion (without reference'·'

any part of the record) that "the only issues remaining as to tn'
exact amount owing to PCA because of farming operations from

t~

year 1980 and whether the home farm (remaining property ownerl :'y
Watts not sold to Gregory)

is subject to the mortgage" is an

absolute misstatement of fact.
Indeed many other issues had been raised by the
pleadings (about which discovery had been conducted and on wh1ci1
the Court had not ruled) that remained to be tried.

It is true

that counsel for PCA did submit a Proposed Partial Summary
Judgment to the Court couched in the language used in their
statement.

Such Proposed Partial Summary Judgment was obiect2

1

by the undersigned, and the Court refused to sign it.

Accordingly, it is not a part of the record, and PCA attached '
copy thereof as an exhibit to its Memorandum Opposing Watts'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

<R.332-3)
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On December 15, 1981, when both sides had moved for
,,J,ar'/

Judgment and the matter was then argued, there were some

,~~ 1 , 1 onal

exhibits offered to the Court by Watts (which had just

ccior thereto been received from PCA pursuant to Watts' Motion to

o':oducio Documents), which exhibits are attached as an additional
suoplemental record, and to which reference will be made
*reinafter.

Said exhibits were indeed received by the Court on

:ecember 15, 1981, and admitted as exhibits by stipulation of the
;utles, even though no reference was made to that in the minute
0

iltry of the court on said date.

<cere before the trial court,

(R.298)

These "Items"or exhibits

were quoted in memoranda of both

,',Arties and were alluded to in subsequent depositions.

(See, for

'<rl.mple, R. 2 91)
(We note in examining the record that in Volume 1 of the
'onscr ipt the numbering of pages runs to 2 98 and then resumes in
,Jiume 2 with number 290,

so there are two sets of record pages

''"11119 from 290 through 298.

, ' Volume 1.

The reference above to page 298 is

The reference to 2 91 above is in Volume 2. )

The thrust of Watts' Motion for Summary Judgment was
'",,''· , settlement agreement had been entered into between PCA and
,,darits Gregory on July 16,

1981,

( R. 268 to 285) which

µment, Watts contended, failed to expressly reserve PCA's
<ht> against Watts as part of the same transaction and
"rord1ngly constituted a release of Watts from all obligation to

-3-

Following the submittal of the remaining memoranda.
docketing of depositions, motions to strike, and filing of
affidavits, the matter was submitted and the court renot1ced 'ne
matter, together with defendants Watts' Motion for Surrunary
Judgment and Foreclosure on the Uniform Real Estate Contract
against defendant Gregory and remaining defendants, for hearino;
June 7, 1983.

At that time the court granted defendants Watls'

Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiff, struck the
Partial Summary Judgment for plaintiff, denied plaintiff's

earL~
Moti0~

for Summary Judgment and granted Watts' Motion for Surrunary
Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure over and against defendant
Gregory and remaining defendants.

(R.411 and Supplemental Record

"Court Proceedings" filed October 11, 1983, with this court.I

Tr-

Sumrnary Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure were docketed witn
the Clerk of the Court July 28,

1983, and PCA filed its Notice "f

Appeal August 11, 1983.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Watts seek to have the judgment of the lower
court affirmed in all particulars.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for respondents discovered in preparing thi~
brief (as noted above) that a series of exhibits receivc>d bv "~
court at the time of argument of defendants'

Motion for swrunac'

Judgment on December 15, 1981, which were identified as Items
through 17, were not included as part of the record on appeal ' -

-4-

oot mentioned in the Minute Entry of the trial court for that
iR.2981
, 1

Said Items constituted documents furnished by the

nt1tt to these defendants pursuant to a Motion to Produce

1ments,

and the parties stipulated that they be received into

·::Jenee. (Items 12 through 15 and Item 17 were copies of cases
:s,od at argument, but the remaining Items 1 through 11 and 16 are
: 1e

exhibits with which we are concerned.)
The undersigned furnish the exhibits therefore as a

sJµplement to the record because, while most of them appear as
s'.tachments to affidavits or depositions, four of them do not
"t~erwise

appear in the record, and reference will be made to them

·,ereafter.

Moreover,

these exhibits were referred to in several

iepos it ions by those numbers (sometimes the number is prefaced
the word "item" and sometimes with the word "exhibit">, and

•lth

,:chout them in that form and order being available to the court
~uld

make the language of the depositions meaningless.
It should also preliminarily be observed that double

:e~ositions
0

of several parties--Milo Watts, Cleown Watts, Buford

regory and Tom Boyer--were taken.

<~

Accordingly, the undersigned

refer to the depositions with a Roman numeral in front to

'llcate which of the two is intended,

such as I Boyer or II Boyer

·tority.
PCA's Statement of Fact is both sketchy and selective
cannot therefore be adopted by Watts.

-5-

Accordingly there

follows a chronological summary of the facts as disclosed by , ~"
record and depositions.
PCA is a lending institution in the business of
financing agriculture, and in order to obtain a loan the farmer
must buy stock in PCA.

The amount of stock required is directl;

related to the amount of the loan obtained.

(Childs Depo. 13.

J

To obtain a loan a farmer would complete an application,
furnish a financial statement, a profit and loss statement for the
three years prior to the application, and a budget or project ion
as to how the asked-for funds would be used during the coming
operating year.

<Childs Depo. 17.)

The loan would then be

considered by the loan officer or lending committee depending on
the amount sought.

The necessary documents, security instruments,

promissory notes, etc., would then be executed.

<Childs Depo. 19-

20.)
In the event a loan was not repaid within the usual
twelve month loan period, the note could be renewed and new
security agreements reflecting changes in collateral or real
estate being pledged would be executed.

Each time an application

for renewal occurred a new budget or summary of the purpose of th"
loan and proposed expenditures would be worked out with the mem~
borrower.<Childs Depo. 20;
Depo. 20-22.

I Boyer Depo. 69 -71;

II Milo Watts

>

Watts had mortgaged their home, farm and range grounu
and around the Kanosh, Utah, area comprising approximately 1,16 6

-6-

ir,

,~res
.. 1

to PCA in connection with annual operating loans beginning

1947.(l Milo Watts Dep. 4)

The last recorded mortgage on said

Jrorerty was executed August 9, 1974, recorded August 16, 1974, in
:he Millard County Recorder's Off ice.

( R .18-21)

Included within

said acreage was a 481-acre irrigated hay and grain farm which
htts sold to Buford L. Gregory on August 14, 1978, on a Uniform
Real Estate Contract which provided, among other things, that the
buyer, Gregory, as his down payment would assume and pay to PCA
tne then balance of the Watts loan of $74,343.65, together with a
first mortgage to Ag Land Mortgage Company in the amount of
526,194.19, and the remaining $260,462,16 balance to be paid in 20
annual installments of $24,585.00, the first payment to be due
\ugust 1, 1979. (R.25-27)

Also sold at the same time were some

items of equipment relating to the farm: a hay chopper, baler,
swather, two-ton truck, ditcher, two feed wagons, a combine and a
carryall scraper

(Bill of Sale, R-28).

Even prior to the

execution of the aforementioned contract, Watts and Buford Gregory
aud his wife, Elizabeth, executed jointly a Security Agreement
;11th PCA pledging certain equipment used on the said farm, in a
document which was blank at the time the Watts signed it (I Cleown
Watts Depo.

44,

49-53),

but which now shows on its face 15 cows,

heifers, and bears a date of July 18, 1978 (R.30).
At or about the time of the sale from Watts to Gregory a
joan

application was made increasing the principal on the PCA loan

trom $74,343.65 to $104,884.00.

That application appears

-7-

repeatedly in the record,

but the clearest copy of its pages

Item 1 in the Supplemental Record noted above.

15

It is to be

observed on this PCA document that it was signed by the president,
Vaughn Mills, July 21, 1978, as having been approved, along with
the signatures of the other members of the loan committee, and on
its face showed that new credit 1 i fe insurance in the upper righthand block was written on Dr. Gregory for $60,000.00 and Elizabeth
Gregory for $10,000.00 with the note that Milo and Cleown Watts'
insurance was "in force until 1-79."

Also on the face of page

it shows an entry January 1, 1978: "proceeds from sale of farm 114
acres)" and on the second page under the heading "Ownership and
Management" indicates the sale of the irrigated farm to a medical
doctor for the sum cf $369, 000,

includes 480 acres plus the hay

and equipment and continues "that the purchaser, Dr. Buford L.
Gregory and his wife, Elizabeth A.,

have agreed to sign on the

full loan balance until paid in full, as a result of new funds set
up to operate in the sum of $20,000."

It concludes,

"Milo Watts

has agreed to continue with the operation this year principally

i~

the role of an advisor and consultant."
Under the following heading,

"Financial Information,"

the financial statements of Milo Watts as of May 1978 and of
Buford Gregory as of February 1978 are outlined,

showing a net

worth in Watts of $538,914 and in Gregory $808,294.

<This, of

course, disputes PCA' s Statement of Fact which claims that "at the
time of this sale Watts were indebted to PCA in the amount of

-8-

S!'J4,884.00"--PCA Brief, Page 3).
· 1 nds

wer~

So $20,000.00 of additional

loaned to Gregory at the time the Gregorys became

]ember-borrowers and took over the 481-acre farm.
Watts stated that Gregory was not only to take over the
loan at PCA and the first mortgage and to make annual payments of
the balance as the contract states, but that substitute collateral

in the form of real estate owned by Gregory in Arizona was to
replace the Watts ground and mortgage as of the annual renewal
:1me, January 1979.CI Milo Watts Depo. 20-23 and 35-36; I Cleown
~tts

Depo. 14-15 and 17.)

CCleown Watts states that this

representation was given to them expressly by the PCA
representative who handled the transaction, Steven L. Adamson,
when the Watts first came to the Salt Lake office of PCA with Dr.
Gregory at the time of the sale of the farm)CPages 14-15).

That

testimony is corroborated by Thomas Boyer, PCA's representative,
who was the agent handling the Watts-Gregory loan and the party
~ost

familiar with it (Childs Depo. 32-33).

Mr.Boyer repeatedly

discussed with his superiors and PCA's attorney, James Dunn, the
sJbstituting of the Arizona collateral for the Watts property (!
'Jyer Depo. 49), had discussions with the Watts regarding it,(!
301·er Depo. 12-15), made notes on a loan document and made efforts
~

secure a trust deed and mortgage on the Arizona property as

<:11 be demonstrated later CI Boyer Depo. 11).
a~omplish

He made efforts to

the release of Watts' collateral and substitution of

·3regory collateral (II Boyer Depo. 28-29), and it was his intent

-9-

on behalf of PCA to get Gregory to sell the Arizona property ana
pay off the loan (II Boyer Depa. 55-56), which is further
corroborated by Item 6--page 3, and Items 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the
Supplemental Record.
Dr. Gregory further confirms that understanding in his
deposition, acknowledging that he went with Watts to PCA at the
time of the real estate contract and assumed the Watts debt 11
Buford Gregory Depa. 12, hereafter IB Gregory Depa."), that he
intended to substitute the Arizona property on the loan and to

~;

off Watts and release them therefrom on condition that PCA would
give him long-term financing (IB Gregory Depo. 24-25, 29-31) and
further that such long-term financing would either pay off or pay
down the Watts obligation (IB Gregory depo. 43 and 46).

Finally,

he was asked in his first deposition at page 48 by his own
counsel:
"When you were talking about the long-term financing
with PCA, did you intend to borrow enough from the PCA to pa;
off your obligation to Watts on the Uniform Real Estate
Contract?"
Answer:
"I am not really sure at this time, but it seems to me
that that was discussed, but I couldn't tell you with any
real degree of certainty at this time. I think so, but I am
not sure."
So indeed he thinks the intention in getting the longterm financing would have been not only to pay off Watts'

loan,

but the whole Watts contract.
In January of 1979 a new annual loan was written up un
Item 2 which shows continuing in force the credit life insurance

-10-

. Jc. Gregory and Elizabeth Gregory, but no renewal of the Watts
In the section under the heading, "Loan Liquidation"
~hows

land sales proceeds at $80,000.00, referring to the

.·.c:zona property as is made more explicit on page 2 under heading
'?epil yrnen t"
"to further explain members' proposed land sale the following
may be helpful.
Member is selling 14 acres of land zoned for
multiple dwellings in the Mesa area. The land is valued at
$1.00 per square foot with member asking $40,000.00 per acre
for a total selling price of $560,000.00. With a mortgage
balance due of $20,000.00 member has equity of $540,000.00.
These sale proceeds will be used to provide the necessary
funds to pay off subject loan in full."
It continues under the heading, "Financial Information":
"Dr. Gregory has a very strong financial statement
characterized by excellent real estate equities. Member's
current statement shows a net worth of $1,606,000.00 against
total liab1lies of $590,000.
His financial statement dated
2. 1 78 showed a net worth of $808,000.00 with total liabilities
of $288,000.00. The increase in liabilities reflects the
farm purchase and a balance due of $250,000.00.
It is the
opinion of this writer that some of the borrower's real
estate holdings are overstated as they are listed at optimum
market prices.
Nevertheless, member has a strong statement
in addition to having an excellent earning potential from his
medical practice."
Under heading "Recommendation":
"We recorrunend the approval of the subject loan as
presented based on member's financial strength and repayment
capacity.
In doing so it is recorrunended that we continue to
include Milo Watts on the loan including the present real
estate mortgage until Dr. Gregory's land sale can be
finalized with subject loan balance paid off in full."
Item 3 is the transmittal letter to Dr. Gregory advising
:~at

the new loan increase of $198,000.00 has been approved,

.n:luding the $74,000.00-plus of the Watts debt he assumed, plus
• 1e

additional $20,000.00 Gregory borrowed to operate the farm ir.

-11-

1978.

It is to be noted that the letter is addressed solely to

Dr. Gregory, not to Gregory and Watts.

This is confirmed by the

Milo Watts testimony that following the sale to Gregorys he was
never consulted about a proposed annual budget with regard to
operating the farm,

nor was he given any accounting regarding

disbursements made and for what after August of 1978 <II Milo
Watts Depa. 20-22).

Tom Boyer adds that no annual renewal of

documentation with regard to security agreements or projected
budgets was done in January of 1979 <I Boyer Depa. 70-71).

He

says specifically,
"But annually it would be updated and brought into focus.
Normally the way that is done is an inventory would be done
and those items found in that inventory would be listed on
there with serial numbers.
Those serial numbers would then
be related directly onto the security agreement and that
would be the normal course."
Q.

"So no new renewal security agreement as of January '79 ever
was prepared for the Watts's signature.
Is that correct?"

A.

"That is correct."

Q.

"That gives you some reason to believe that alternate
security or collateral should have been obtained and that
the original intention, correct?"

A.

"This is what I am basing my opinion on, yes."

wes

(page 71l

Item #5 was the additional loan report on March 19,
1979, seeking an additional loan of $20,000.00 for the purpose o'
building a shed on the farm,

for which Gregory applied.

It

is

noted in page 2 of the repayment plan that 75% or $18,000.00 ot
the cost of the shed was to be repaid from ASCS.

-12-

Tom Boyer identified ASCS as "the Agricultural
ab1l1zation & Conservation Service."
,, Mr.

When asked about this Item

Boyer indicated that it had been written prior to his

-ecom1ng an employee of PCA, but that he had some involvement with
.c after he became an employee and more particularly after
cdat1ons with Gregory had soured some time in October of 1979 and
cnat he had contacted a Mr. Ron Childs (no relation to his
sJpervisor, Les Childs) to advise ASCS that PCA was in a
'foreclosure posture" and notwithstanding the language on page 2

A Item 5 that "repayment to PCA for the $18,000.00 increase will
:ome from ASCS after the shed has been constructed.

This is not

"xpected to be received until September of 1979," that no payment
,·as received from ASCS and that he, Boyer, "suggested (to Mr. Ron
that he might hold that for a while until such time as we

~n1lds)

•ere able to solve out or see what direction we were going to
:ake.

And to my knowledge, no payment was ever made to PCA."

11 Boyer

Depo. 31-34).

He concluded that no such payment came,

': least during the term he was in PCA' s employ from June of 1979
:hrough December of 1980. Cp. 34)
Boyer dictated and signed the remaining Items 6, 7, 9
.-.d 10, and was the addressee on Item 8 and therefore testified

1om direct personal knowledge.
Item 6 was titled "Crop Inspection Report" and was typed
~1s

direction following his inspection of the Gregory farm made

:J,~.eotime

around the 14th of August 1979.

-13-

Page 3 of Item 6 states:

"The Gregory loan has excellent potential of becoming
one of our best loans. Current problems are centered aroun 0
the transition from Mesa, Arizona, Kanosh area.
The farminy
is different, the people different and that has required
·
change. The sale of 13.2 acres in Arizona will conclude the
change and then a year or two of operating here will give
them adequate experience required to make the change. They
also plan to purchase the farm bordering them on the north
The SCS is presently studying soil and water information for
production possibilities
if Dee's check on the deal will be
on track. This addition will make the farm a good sized
operation.• Dr. Gregory is currently in a lawsuit with a
character in Phoenix who is attempting to force sale of his
13.2 acres.
It is fully anticipated that Dr. Gregory will
win and if he does he has sale for the property at $400, 000.
This will help him to clear us out and make a sizable down
payment on the new farm.
Then we will provide annual
operating money with possibly a cattle loan also. These
people are learning fast and will be an excellent group of
operators in a short while. The financial position is
strong.
Dr. Gregory still has his medical profession backing
him up. All things considered we are looking at a number 1
or nuir.ber 2 loan at renewal. (Emphasis added)
Boyer was asked if that language were his own, if he had
proofread the document after it had been typed, and if it fairly
reflected what he wanted to say, to all of which questions he
answered yes.

He continued, the said Item 6 was critically

necessary as basis for getting Item 7 approved.
31)

(II Boyer Depo.

Item 7, the additional loan action report shows on its face

the sale of 13.2 acres in Mesa, Arizona, for a liquidating amount
of $400,000.00.

Under the box "Additional Loan Papers to be

Obtained" is listed "mortgage on 13.2 acres, description
attached," and a handwritten note saying "no more increases unti'
Arizona property sold" with initials and the date of December
1978.

7,

Page 2 of the Item says under the heading "Loan Purpose"

"increase to provide interim financing of $48,890.00 and living
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expenses.

some attorney's fees are needed for a lawsuit involving the

~~so
,1

Expenses have run more than was originally anticipated.

2 acres in Arizona.

Even if Gregory loses, he will still get

,]65,000.00."

Under the heading "Repayment" it states "they have a
.:omm1tment on the '79 hay crop which will approximate $66,000.00.
~he

sale of the Arizona property will liquidate most of the total

liability ($314,863.00)."
Boyer testified about that exhibit at some length, to
•'11ch we will refer in a moment,

but in connection therewith

:est1fied that Item 8 was received by him from Thomas Christensen
Jf F'abian

&

Clendenin, Dr. Gregory's attorney, pursuant to his

request for a copy of the legal description of the Arizona
eroperty.

He was asked the question, "Why did you ask for the

description?" and answered, "In order that we might obtain a deed

Jf trust."

CII Boyer Depo. 10)

He continued that having received

'.he description he prepared the promissory note, the deed of
trust, and Item 9.

When asked about that he said it bore two

jates originally, the date of August 21, 1979, corrected to
September 13, 1979, and that Items 9 and 7 were typed at
essentially the same time, that it (Item 9) was indeed mailed to

:r. Gregory on the later date, and that enclosed with it were a
·:om1ssory note and a deed of trust.
~hat

He was asked the question:

was the deed of trust?" and answered, "The deed of trust

,ie:tained to this 13.2 acres of land in Arizona."
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Q.

"Who prepared the deed of trust?"

A.

"We did."

Q.

"We meaning?"

A.

"Utah Farm Production Credit, secretary Lucille Williams."

Q.

"Did you furnish her the description as received from Mr.
Christensen?"

A.

"Yes as accompanied in the letter of Item 8."

Q.

"Did you mail out that deed of trust?"

A.

"Yes."

Q.

"In this reg. letter Item number 9?"

Ae

"Yes."

Q.

"Along with the promissory note?"

A.

"Yes."

Q.

"Did you get either the trust deed or the promissory note
back from Mr. Gregory?"

A.

"We received back the promissory note.
We did not receive
back the deed of trust."<II Boyer Depo. 12.)
At pages 5 through 18 in the same deposition Mr. Boyer

indicates that the additional increase of $48,890.00 reflected in
Item 7 was not to have been disbursed until the trust deed
enclosed with Item 9 had been returned and that the penciled-in
note on Item 7 was in the handwriting of Vaughn Mills, the
president, and corroborated his earlier testimony in his first
deposition in which from memory he had said he had remembered a
notation to the effect, "Hold funds until Arizona property has
been secured." <I Boyer Depo. 11, line 8)

He then continues on

pages 18 and 19 to indicate that Mr. Naylor, the Salt Lake office
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:11

anager at the time released to Gregory without condition the

_Jnds conditionally authorized in the said $48,000.00 increase,
irj

did so without the trust deed because there was a lien on the

Arizona property that would need to be lifted before they could
·ecord a trust deed and further because the Gregorys' account was
overdrawn.

(II Boyer Depo. 18-19)
Boyer was asked:

"Q

Was there any discussion held at that time about the trust
deed on the Arizona property that you referred to in Item 9?

"A.

Yes

·'Q.

What was the discussion about that?

"A.

It was not much of a discussion actually.
Dr. Gregory simply
informed me that we would not be receiving the deed of trust
on the Arizona property; that since we had backed out on our
end of things he was not about to give us the deed of trust
on the Arizona property.

"Q.

Did he talk in terms of long-term financing with regard to
that deed of trust?

"A.

No.

''Q.

Didn't he indicate one of the reasons for backing out was
that he expected a long-term financing in order to give you a
deed of trust on the Arizona property?

"A.

I understand. By long-term financing, you are talking about a
long term relationship.

'Q.

Over a period of years rather than a one-year budget
situation?

'A.

Okay,

yes, he expected us to carry him from year to year
rather than being paid out annualy as we normally would--as
Utah Farm Production Credit normally expected its customers
to do in this type of a situation.

"This was an annual loan.
We normally expected this type of
loan to be paid out yearly or at least reduced to a very
minimum carry-over. And Dr. Gregory felt that since he was
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just starting we should carry the whole amount over. And '""
were simply not in a pas it ion.
The loan was too weak to de,
that." III Boyer Depa. 14-15)
In his earlier deposition Boyer had indicated as follows:
"I met with Dr. Gregory several times,
memory, I discussed this loan increase
$49,000.00 with him with the intention
the Arizona property for this and that
Arizona property with this, that there
advances to come." (I Boyer De po. 5 9) .

but to the best of my
of 48, nearly
that we would tie up
lf we did tie up the
would be additiona:

So, when relations with Dr. Gregory soured, he then
mailed Item #10 to Gregory suggesting, "You may want to make plans
for selling the Arizona property as soon as possible."

This Item

is dated November 21, 1979.
It was in this same time frame that drafts came in
against the said $48,000.00 increase as reflected in Item 4.

The

first of these dated September 19, 1979, is for $24,500.00 and
indicates that it was a land payment to Milo Watts.

Mr. Boyer

identified that draft and indicated the signature of Lindy Ann
Gregory was that of Dr. Gregory's daughter, who was an author i ?.ea
signatory.

III Boyer Depo. 161

He was asked specifically:

"Q.

Is there anything on the document that indicates who at PCA
approved the draft and permits the funds to be transferred?'

"A.

Yes."

"Q.

Whose initials appear on that?"

"A.

It is his name, Thad.
The name Thad appears on there,
indicating it is Thad Allen, one of the loan off1cers at
Production Credit, is the one who authorized in fact all
three of these drafts on item 4." (II Boyer Depa. 16-17)
Boyer later admitted that there is nothing in Item 7

that would suggest that $24,000.00 of the $48,000.00 increase
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,r~a

was to go toward making the land purchase payment to the

,,:ts and then asked if he ever corrununicated to the Watts that
··,JS

money was being borrowed from PCA to pay on their real estate

·ontract with Gregory, his answer was,
"I have no recollection of a discussion of that nature."

ce

·.;as then asked the question,

"At any time?", and answered,

"At any time.
I better correct that.
I may have discussed
with them after the fact and after things had deteriorated
that that's where it did come from, but prior to that and
irrunediately thereafter there was no discussion." (II Boyer
De po . 21- 2 2 l
In the same deposition, under examination by Gregorys'
o:torney, Mr. Boyer elaborated further as follows:
..

~

"A.

What is a number 1 or a number 2 loan?"
At PCA, we had four, five interest rates.
We have two better
than average interest rates, a B rate, we called it for our
average customer, and then two higher rates for our poorer
customers, so to speak.
At this point in time, it was my
opinion that we would get the Arizona property sold and we'd
have the loan paid down or out, in which case we would be in
an excellent financial position with them, because of the
security strength and so forth, and in that case we would
have a 1 or a 2 loan."
A number 1 or number 2 would have been
Indicating one of our better loans.•

(II Boyer Depo. 561

On further examination by the undersigned he was asked:
Now, in fact the items on the first page of item #7 relating
to the Mesa property, and the reference to having it sold and
getting the trust deed, had they not been there, would you
have recommended that this increase would have happened?
~.

No.
I might add that the reason the 13.2 acres is only on
the front and not under the security, is it had the lis
pendens on it.
And I was instructed not to list it as
security, because we could not get free clear title on
it.

-19-

"Q.

You would not have been able to have a valid claim against
with this lis pendens against you?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

With regard to that I think you have testified to it. Who
was it that asked for the increases, Gregory or Watts?

"A.

Gregory."

<II Boyer Depo. 61-62)

He was then asked whether Watts and Gregory were comakers or principal guarantors and following objections and a
colloquy for some pages, he then expressed his opinion and
summarized the facts as follows:
"It was and currently is my understanding that they
basically define each as follows:
A co-signer is a person
who signs a promissory note, who has a direct involvement in
the funds being borrowed, and the repayment of those funds
and in the use of those funds.
Most commonly, the co-signer
has a financial interest in the funds.
"Guarantor, a person who signs the promissory note, who
has an indirect involvement in the funds being borrowed. The
person is offering his or her financial strength to support
another's endeavor.
In case of default, his or her assets
will be called upon in amounts sufficient to meet the
delinquent loan amount.
"Q.

Is that your understanding?

"A.

That was my understanding as I worked at PCA and the banks
and so forth.
Therefore, as follows:
"My testimony is based on those terms being defined as 1
just heretofore defined them.
The Gregorys were the sole
managers of the property, funds and equipment on the
Gregory/Watts farm, as referred to by the Gregory/Watts far~
to distinguish between this and the loans on other Watts
property. Gregorys requested and drafted all funds that wer
disbursed. Watts requested none of them, but did sign lhP
notes, indicating some level of acceptance.
In all cases,
repayment was to come from Gregory's income, either from farrT
production or real estate holdings.
Watts were not expected
to make any repayment, except in case of default.
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"In cases of the primary security in all cases, the
security was that of Gregorys and secondarily that of
Watts.
~r1mary

"That was my understanding of the 109 acres, that it was
the Gregorys' and that the cattle were Gregorys'. That is
what I was sent down there to collect.
That is what I was
after.
"So based on that definition and those facts I would
make the judgment that in my opinion, Watts were guarantors
to Gr egorys." (I I Boyer Depa. 62-65).
Perhaps Mr. Boyer's understanding of the facts is best
'"~~arized

in the following exchange in his first deposition:

"Q.

Were you ever involved in a conversation either before you
left PCA's employ or afterward, in which you discussed with
Mr. Childs the fact that it was the Watts's understanding
that when the January following the Gregory purchase rolled
around that the Watts's remaining property was to be released
from the mortgage and alternate security or collateral in
Arizona or elsewhere was to be supplied by Gregorys? Do you
remember having any discussion along those lines with Mr.
Childs at any point in time?

"A.

I do not remember discussing it, in other words going into
his office and saying, 'Here's the way I see it.' At various
times when we would travel to the attorney together or when
we were in discussion of the case, I did indicate to him that
I felt that Milo was basically--maybe I shouldn't use this
term--an innocent victim of this loan." (I Boyer Depo. 48-49)

There was one additional loan to Gregorys only in June
f 19 79,

which cancer ned Wat ts in only two ways:

First, in

'01rnection with said loan Gregorys executed an assignment of their
~u1ty

in the farm purchase agreement (the Uniform Real Estate

:Dtract noted above> to PCA, which was recorded June 28, 1979, in
·1e

Millard County Recorder's Office.

(R.23-24)

That increased

'Jan is reflected by promissory note in the amount of $38,890.00
:ac~d ,June 1,

19 79, signed only by the Gregorys and marked Exhibit
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A attached to the original Complaint of plaintiffs (R.22

J

J'hdi

note and assignment will figure into the security agreement
referred to above executed by the Watts and the Gregorys 1n Jui
of 1978 and which is attached as Exhibit H to plaintiff's
Complaint (R.29-30) as will be discussed hereinafter.
We should here mention that out of the increase
reflected in Item 7 above, Gregorys got permission from Boyer to
pay $5,000.00 attorney's fee to an Arizona counsel (!B Greyoty
Depo. 26).
Cleown Watts was asked several times why she and her
husband signed the promissory notes of January, March and
September of 1979

(!

Cleown Watts Depo. 9, 12) and explained tha'

i t was her understanding that as of the first of the year I 197J 1

the matter would be straightened out and substitute collateral
provided and that the note would be exclusively the Gregor ys' th erafter.

(IC Watts Depo. 13-19>

She reiterates that she was

reassured of that by Steven L. Adamson, PCA' s representative, w•t:
whom they dealt at the time of the sale to the Gregorys.

IP.14-1'

Perhaps the most explicit testimony came in response to crossexamination from Dr. Gregory's attorney.

The witness test1fiPJ

the promissory notes were brought to Watts' residence by members
of the Gregory family.
''Q.

She was then asked:

Do you recall when those notes were presented to y0u clny
statements being made by any member of the Gregory fam1l1
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1 don't recall any statements at the time,

no.

Any reasons why you were being asked to sign expressed by any
member of the Gregory family?
Just that we owned the property and the property was still in
our name and we were just signing for that reason.
Did a member of the Gregory family tell you that or was that
your understanding through your relationship with PCA?
I

It was more our understanding with the relationship with PCA.

;

,,, Christensen: "Okay."
FURTHER EXAMINATION
;y MR. SCHOFIELD:

With respect to that, Mrs. Watts, that, you think, came about
because of your conversation with Mr. Adamson.

And did it come about because of any other conversations or
discussions someone from PCA.
I don't recall.

The only one you do recall is this conversation in August
with Mr. Adamson?
';,

Yes." (IC.Watts Depo. 57-58)
Sometime in 1980 Dr. Gregory vacated the subject farm

'1d PCA, while denying that

did admit that they entered into an agreement with Milo

:r~oerty,

''otcs

it "had taken possession" of the real

on June 1, 1980, to "finance the farming operation of the

;:irty,

II

(PCA Answers to Interrogatories #10, R.181)
Boyer indicated:

''Jn

the forepart of '80, which would have gone from March
we made efforts to talk with Milo as to the

into June,
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and Arizona taxes without consultation or

~ttorneys

"n'.':19

44,

lncluding expenditures for
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I C.iolatts Depo.

credits and payments on PCA's

90-l; Amended by Allen Affid.,

R.

262;

Brown Letter-

of Supp. Record).
From the foregoing,
~nd

of 1980,

1t must be obvious to all that as of

had the matter come to trial,

· no possibility for summary

there would have

judgment in favor of any party,

he1ng a multitude of factual questions to be resolved.
This was all dramatically changed by the execution of
Settlement Agreement by PCA and Gregorys on July 16,
. b8-28SJ
.<.. lants

1981 .

It was on the basis of that Settlement Agreement that
Watts made their Motion for Summary Judgment,

u.t1mately granted.

which the

More will be said about that and the

relating to it and the consequences flowing therefrom in the
:_~~~t

portion of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POI'.'JT I.

THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS

•ERE ACCOMMODATION MAKERS.
·Counsel for
·· :•at
··""'" 1or

:~ere

are

i:na::-:·

·~o.

PCA,

in Point

issues of
iciors,

I of his Argument,

~act,

rather
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under the

argues that defendants

than accommodation makers and

in support of that assertion selectively chooses from the
documents noted heretofore in our Statement of Facts at length su
much of them as allude to the original collateral first pledged

1,

the Watts loan of 1974, coupled with some after-the-fact
affidavits acquired from three former employees of PCA <Mills,
Naylor and Wood).

All of those affidavits were objected to and

were moved to be stricken by Watts for several reasons, not the
least of which that they were self-serving, presumed to express a
corporate opinion, and further presumed to suggest what was in the
minds of parties not testifying and could not accordingly be
on personal knowledge.

bas~

The Court did not rule on any of the

Motions to Strike, and it is submitted by the undersigned that it
is immaterial whether they were to be accepted as part of the
record or not because the affidavits miss the point, as does the
Argument of PCA's counsel.
Being an accommodation maker or a primary obligor is no·
a question of the "intent" of the would-be creditor or holder of
creditor or beneficiary of an obligation, but rather a matter of
fact.

It is to be noted, however as an example, that the

paragraph cited from Mr. Wood, who was incidentally involved with
the renewal- note, loan action report and credit notice letter
<Items 2 and 3 noted above) is impeached by those very documPnts
as noted above under the heading "Loan History," "Financial
Information," the letter addressed solely to Gregory, and the face
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sregory's financial statement, as well as Watts', was spelled

It is also to be noted that counsel for PCA adds
.i~guage
:.1e

at page 10 and 11 of its brief that does not appear in

record, calling the first mortgage on 109 acres, the "(Watts

cmel" and the second mortgage on 1,257 acres "(Watts farm)."

The

' :arentheses additions are voluntary surplus of counsel and are not
the original documents and were never identified as such in the

.1

:ecord or in the depositions.
~s

Indeed, Tom Boyer thought 109 acres

acreage owned by Gregory located somewhere in the Fillmore

irea. III Boyer Depo. 41, 48, 50, 51>

Unquestionably part of the

Mrtgaged property described in the exhibits

belonged to Milo

iatts as obviously a portion of it was the 480 acres sold to
~~cry,

'he

but there is nothing in the record to identify on any of

documents listing collateral to actually specifically identify

..ie 480

acres with which we are here involved.
The undersigned also disputes PCA's counsel's argument

Watts received a "direct benefit" in these transactions.

:~t

'oart from the fact that the amount assumed by Gregorys was
ipproximately $74,000.00, not $105,000.00 as noted in the
·:c,tement of Facts above, the matter of benefit is a question of
0

ns1deration running between Gregorys and Watts,
~at

not between PCA

ts .
PCA asserts that Section 70A-3-606, Utah Code Annotated,

J\J,

is not applicable in this case since it relates only to
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parties holding a right of recourse,

i.e., accommodation part1"

and PCA asserts that Watts are not accommodation parties.
PCA's assertion,

it appears,

is based upon a

misunderstanding of the law of accommodation parties as it rela:·
to the law of primary and secondary liability.
because the Watts'

PCA asserts tha:

signatures appear on the note as co-signers,

they cannot be accommodation parties.

It is apparently PCA's

belief that since a co-signer is primarily liable, he cannot be a·
accommodation party.

Under this view only parties secondarily

liable on instruments can be accommodation parties.
course, clearly not the law.

That is, of

The doctrine of primary and

secondary liability is a doctrine which relates primarily to the
holder of the note (creditor).
primarily liable,
forthwith.

If a party to the note is

then the holder can proceed against him

On the other hand, a party who is secondarily liable

can only be proceeded against after the creditor has taken cerL1L
preliminary steps as to the party or parties primarily liable.
It is irrelevant whether a party is primarily or
secondarily liable as it relates to accommodation parties.

The

rights of the creditor against parties primarily liable are

t~e

same whether such parties receive the benefit of the cons1der3t
or merely sign to allow someone else to receive that bener
(aside from issues relating to discharge).

On the other

1'

han~.

doctrine of accommodation parties is a doctrine which relates
primarily to the relationship between che debtors themselves.
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1ne states in substance that as between debtors, the party
:~ce1ves

the benefit of the consideration must reimburse the

to the note who did not receive such consideration in the
~nt

such party sustains a loss by virtue of default on the note,

-at 1s to say the accommodation party is given recourse over
" 1

nst the accommodated party for any loss sustained by the

.::ommodation party.
Section 70A-3-415 states in subparagraph 1 as follows:
"An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument
1n any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to
another party to it."
(Emphasis added.)
It is thus clear that the accommodation party can be a
i\or, drawer, endorser, co-maker, or can sign on a note in any
·1er capacity.

Subparagraph 5 of said section states:

"An accommodation party is not liable to the party
and if he pays the instrument has a right of
recourse on the instrument against such party." (Emphasis
added.)
acco~Tiodated,

Comment 1 to the official text of the Uniform Commercial
·Je found under Section 3-415 states as follows:
"l.
Subsection (1) recognizes that an accommodation
party is always a surety (which includes a guarantor>, and it
is his only distinguishing feature.
He differs from other
sureties only in that his liability is on the instrument and
he is a surety for another party to it.
His obligation is
therefore determined by the capacity in which he signs.
An
e~commodation maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument
•1thout any resort to his principal, while an accommodation
1ndorser may be liable only after presentment, notice of
dishonor and protest. The subsection recognizes the defenses
nf a surety in accordance with the provisions subjecting one
not a holder in due course to all simple contract defenses,
as well as his rights against his principal after payment.
Under subsection (3) except as against a holder in due course
·•1thout notice of the accommodation, parol evidence is
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admissible to prove that the party has signed for
accommodation."
As 2 F. Hart and W. Willier, Bender's Uniform CommercialCode
Service§ 13.03 states at 13-10 <1983):
"Equally confused and misleading has been the use of the
terms 'secondary'and 'primary' with reference to contract~:
liability and to the suretyship transaction.
In the
suretyship sense, 'secondary' simply refers to the fact that
the obliger rather than the surety ought to pay or perform;
hence, his obligation is 'primary' and the surety's
•secondary.' However, in a contractual sense, 'secondary'
refers to conditional liability, i.e., conditions precendent
to the promiser's duty of performance, while 'primary' refers
to an unconditional or absolute duty to perform.
Thus, a
surety is always 'secondarily' liable in the suretyship
sense, but he may be either 'primarily' or 'secondarily'
liable in the contractual sense, depending upon the terms~
his agreement with the obligee.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus an accommodation maker is primarily or secondarily
liable to the holder of the note depending on the capacity in
which he signs, a maker being primarily liable, and an endorser
being secondarily liable, but as between an accommodation party
and the accommodated party, the accommodation party is "always a
surety."
The Watts then as accommodation parties are always
sureties as to the Gregorys and thus are entitled to recourse
against Gregorys on the notes.
This is obviously a doctrine based upon principles of
fair play and good conscience.

If the accommodation party is made

to pay the obligation, but has no right of recourse against the
accommodated party, then the accommodated party is granted an
unconscionable benefit.

He gets the benefit of the proceeds ot
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,e note, but never has to pay anyone for them.

The same is true

the right of recourse is in any way limited or impaired.
It is clear in the instant case that from and after the
·igning of the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Watts and
;regory, the Wat ts became accornrnoda t ion parties as to Gregory.

It

true that at the time of the signing of that note the Watts

_5

1wed

PCA an indebtedness on the farm of approximately $74,000.00.

jowever, Gregory assumed that indebtedness as a part of the
;urchase price (i.e., he got an equity in the land commensurate
'•1th said assumed debt), and thus as between Watts and Gregory it
:ecame the indebtedness of Gregory.

Indeed we can say that in

of feet Watts paid Gregory to assume said debt--to make it his.

It

:s thus clear that from and after the signing of that contract,
:he original Watts'

indebtedness became the indebtedness of

;regory as between Watts and Gregory.

Gregory had received a

:ons1deration for assuming that debt in the nature of part payment
}f the purchase pr ice.

Furthermore, from and after the date of the signing of
"hat contract, all monies disbursed by PCA for the farm or in
~nnection

therewith inurred to the benefit of the equitable owner

.f the farm,

to-wit, Gregory, the contract purchaser.

·.sbursements from PCA for improvements on the farm could not
Jre to the benefit of Watts.
"

0

Even if the value of the farm had

n doubled or tripled by said disbursements, that increase in
e could not help Watts.

11 1
-

Any improvements to the farm through
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disbursements from PCA would inure in law to the benefit of
Gregory.

From and after the date of the signing of that contracl,

Gregory was deemed the owner of the farm in equity, and Watts were
deemed to have a scurity interest only.

It is thus inescapable

that as between Watts and Gregory, Watts was an accommodation
maker and Gregory was the accommodated party, both as to the
original debt and as to all subsequent loans, the proceeds of
which went entirely to Gregorys by the undisputed facts.
As noted throughout the Statement of Facts above,
Gregorys asked for and received all the increases extended by PCA,
wrote all the drafts spending the same to pay their bills-including the only installment paid to Watts on the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.
PCA has claimed that Watts did get one benefit, and

that

is that one of the disbursements to Gregory was used by him to pay
one annual installment to Watts on the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

This cannot be deemed to be a disbursement to Watts

from PCA, such as would preclude Watts from being an accommodation
party for a number of reasons:

First, the Watts were not advised

until long after the fact that Gregory had so used the money.
Second, only after the money was chargeable to Gregory did he
use it to pay his debt to Watts.

Third, Gregory had a duty to

Watts an annual payment of $24,500.00.
he used to discharge that debt.

th~

The money he got from PLA

He borrowed $24,500.00 and got

the full use of it in paying his debt in that amount.
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Watts on

1

1

ce other hand had a right to receive $24,500.00 on the annual

;ayrnent without having that amount charged against his collateral.
or the $24, 500. 00 Watts received he cancelled $24, 500. 00 of debt
Gregory owed him in the land contract and he got charged

~ich
, 1 t~
0

$24,500.00 against his home and other land.

Watts therefore is a $24,500.00 deficit.

The net result

It must therefore be

Jbv1ous that Gregory got the only real benefit and Watts once
igain just got used.
Furthermore, the PCA indebtedness was at a much higher
interest rate < 12 .18% - R.17) than the land contract C7% ~Watts

R. 50 l,

is additionally hurt in that regard.
PCA asserts that some of the money went to pay "joint

obligations" of Watts and Gregory.
e'1idence of this.
wi~ly,

There is not one shred of

Watts and Gregory did not owe anyone anything

except PCA, and the disbursements from PCA obviously did

oot go back to PCA.

Watts and Gregory were not joint operators of

'.he farm and there simply were no such joint debts.
Finally, on this point, PCA,

in knowingly and secretly

idvancing money to Gregory for him to make an illusory payment to
~tts,

does not constitute good faith dealing.

i~commodation

~nown

Watts as

maker was entitled to know of any significant fact

to PCA that effected his suretyship position.

Watts had a

'Jht to be timely advised that Gregory did not have money for the

1

:;inual payment in order to permit Watts to take steps to timely
,cotect himself.

Instead PCA let him become so deeply enmeshed in
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j l

the

such

respect to any such person does not discharge any pa,t·;
as to whom presentment, protest or not ice of dishonor ;.
effective or unnecessary; or
( b)

unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument
given by or on behalf of the party or any person aga1ns·
whom he has a right of recourse.

( 2)

Sy express reservation of rights against a party with a
right of recourse the holder preserves

(a)

all his rights against such party as of the time when
the instrument was originally due; and

( b)

the right of the party to pay the instr11ment as of that
time; and

(c)

All rights of such party to recourse against others."
<Emphasis added.)
The Uniform Commercial Code thus also provides that if

the holder of a note (PCA in this case) discharges any party to
the instrument (Gregorys in this case) without "express
reservation of rights as "against a party" thereto, such party or
parties are released, and it is thus clear that the Watts must be
deemed to be totally released under the circumstances of this case
inasmuch as there certainly was no express reservation of rights
against them.
It its brief PCA at tempts to rely on the fact that the
name "Watts" appears in the Settlement Agreement.

It is true that

the Watts name does appear in the Agreement, but it cannot, by an.
stretch of the imagination, be deemed to be an "express
reservation of rights."

We do not think that the references t0

the Watts are even an implied reservation of rights,
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but even if

are granted that exalted status, such reservation certainly
not amount to an "express reservation of rights."

;~es

"Express" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as

I 'allows:
"EXPRESS. Clear; definite; explicit; unmistakable; not
dubious or ambiguous.
In re Moon's Will, 107 Vt. 92, 176 A.
410, 412. Clear, definite, plain, direct. State ex rel.
l\ndrews v. Zangerle, 101 Ohio St. 235, 128 N.E. 165, 167.
Declared in terms; set forth in words.
Directly and
distinctly stated. State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344
Mo. 665, 127 S.W. 2d 697, 699. Explicit. Elliott v. Hudson,
117 W,Va. 345, 185 S.E. 465,467; made known distinctly and
explicitly, and not left to inference. Minneapolis Steel &
Machinery Co. v. Federal Surety Co., C.C.A.Minn., 34 F.2d
270, 274. Manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. The
word is usually contrasted with 'implied.' State v. Denny,
118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65."
(See page 691 of
the 4th Edition.)
The Settlement Agreement was executed July 16, 1981, and
•s clearly a document running solely between PCA and Buford A. and
:lizabeth A. Gregory, who were the only signatories thereon.
·~re

are some ancillary references only to Watts.

These largely

;ppear in the "Recitals" where the Watts name is mentioned only in
~n~ection

~.

with the instant lawsuit.

The critical paragraph is

6 on page 4 where, after excluding the new obligations agreed

:o by the parties in paragraphs 1 through 5 of the Agreement, PCA
1en

does
"release and discharge Gregorys and each of them from any and
all liability which they may have to PCA under the
Gregory/Watts notes, under the Gregory note, under the
mortgage, under any security agreements, under the Assignment
of Equity, and under any other documents of security given to
PCA by Gregorys, or either of them, to secure their

-37-

indebtedness to PCA under the Gregory/Watts notes and the
Gregory note, provided, however, this release shall not
constitute a release of any obligations of Gregorys to PCA
under the documents and covenants set forth in paragraphs J
through 5 hereof.
From and after the execution hreof, PCA's
sole remedy for sums due it from Gregorys under the
Gregory/Watts notes shall be through foreclosure sale of ~.
Gregory farm and/or the Home Farm and PCA's sole remedy for
recovery for the sums due it from the Gregorys under the
Gregory note shall and under those documents and covenants
set forth in paragraphs l through 5 hereof.
(Emphasis
added. J

1

The most that can be said about the above language is
the use of the words "foreclosure sale" and the use of the phrase
"the Home Farm" are in PCA's view implied references to Watts, but
that language, when it is qualified twice by the underlined
language reducing it to remedies against Gregorys "for sums due

1t

from the Gregorys" clearly negates such an argument.
PCA then alludes to paragraph 8 proposing it a
stipulation to be filed in the lawsuit in the form as the
Exhibit E provides.

(R.284-SJ

attach~

It is to be noted that all four

paragraphs of said stipulation make no reference whatever--impli~
or expressed--to the Watts, and that document is the release of
parties in this matter.

PCA' s counsel quotes paragraphs 2 and l

again with relation to foreclosing any right, title and interest
"of Gregorys" and counsel then makes the novel argument that not
mentioning Watts is somehow an express reservation of rights
against them and further attempts to buttress his argument hy
quoting from an affidavit of Anthony Schofield in which Schof1el·i
presumes to say, "It was expressly understood between all parties
to the stipulation that plaintiff in this matter would proceed as
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_....I'

inst defendant Watts." <R. 266 l

Watts, through their counsel,

to strike this affidavit on the grounds that the statement

oov~

:c:inot be based upon personal knowledge and cannot presume to
ggest what was in the mind of other parties or persons.

,, 1

(R.292)

.\part from its self-serving character and presumptuousness in
purporting to allege what was in the minds of Gregorys and/or
'.heir attorneys, there is the direct contradiction in the
;r.equivocal language of the Glen Clark and Tom Christensen
.\ffidavit (R.Vol.l,296) at paragraph 2, which reads in part:
"At no time during the settlement negotiations or
thereafter until November 11, 1981, did any of the parties to
the Settlement Agreement and/or their counsel request, give
or in any form mention an express reservation of rights as to
Milo and Cleown Watts in connection with the three promissory
notes referred to in paragraph A of the Recitals contained in
the Settlement Agreement."
(Emphasis added.)
It was at this November 11, 1981, meeting that counsel
'.~

PCA attempted to obtain signatures of the Gregorys to the

\Jdendurn to Settlement Agreement {R. 309-10), which by a cursory
reading makes it clear that PCA was then--five months after the
~ct--trying to

include an express reservation of rights against

:he Watts that they failed to do on July 16, 1981, when they
'Xecuted the Settlement Agreement.
001

That position is repeatedly

ne out in the testimony taken in the short depositions of Glen

ior k,

Tom Christensen and Dr. Buford Gregory on November 19,

id!.

While counsel for PCA repeatedly tried to put the words in

.:ce witnesses'

mouths that there was an intent or an understanding

-39-

or an agreement about reserving claims against the Watts, such
questions were objected to,

but responded to in the negative.

As PCA's brief notes, they repeatedly allude to the
"Farm" rather than the Watts personally.

PCA's counsel fails to

note Clark's own objection except as he alluded to it in his
answer.
But such parole evidence is inadmissible, particularly in
light of paragraph 13 of the Settlement Agreement, entitled
"Integration:"
"This agreement constitutes the entire agreement among
the parties pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and
supersedes all prior agreements and understandings pertain1~
thereto.
No covenant, representation or condition not
expressed in this agreement shall affect or be deemed to
interpret, change or restrict the express provisions hereoL'
(Emphasis added. l
Such provision, if it is to be given any effect at all precludes
PCA from here and now trying to represent some other intent

beyo~

what is clearly expressed in the language within the four corners
of the document itself.

That argument should further be

buttressed by the fact that the Clark/Christensen Affidavit makes
it clear that the Settlement Agreement was prepared by counsel fm
PCA with only some minor changes suggested by Christensen with
regard to the new collateral referred to in said Agreement.
CR.Vol.1,296)
Accordingly, the long-standing rule that a document
shall be construed most strictly against the party preparing 1t
should here be given effect.
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The Clark/Christensen testimony is further inadmissible
, che reasons stated by Clark (omitted in PCA brief) before he
"Mr. Clark:

I will object to questions about that

.wersation on the ground that the conversation was in connection
,;tn

an Addendum in the Settlement Agreement, and the conversation

wolved settlement and, therefore,
>po

is not admissible."

<Clark

6I

It is thus clear that the Watts must be deemed to be
:oleased by failure of PCA to provide for an "express
:eservation."
·o~cl

The case law likewise makes inevitable the the same

us ion.
Melo v. National Fuse, 267 Fed Supp 611 CD.Colo., 1967)

.rivolved a mining accident which injured the plaintiff.

The

'1aintiff initially brought suit in the state of Utah against
cOJan Powder Co., and that case was settled and a stipulation of
.:smissal signed and an order of dismisal entered pursuant
:~reto.

Later on the plaintiff sued another defendant in the

·1strict of Colorado for the same injury.

The court held that the

:cah law governed and that the action of the plaintiff was
.:reclosed by the provisions of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act
·:und at 15-4-1 et seq.

The court stated at page 613:

"Having received a substantial amount from the Trojan
Powder Co. in full settlement, and having dismissed his
action against that company on the merits and with prejudice
but without reserving any rights, plaintiff thus released the
present defendant.
The motion for summary judgment is well
taken."
<Emphasis added.)
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In Williams v.Greene, 506 P2d 64, the Supreme Court

n

Utah affirmed the granting of a motion for summary judgment
dismissing the action. In that case the plaintiff sustained

se~

burns, for which he brought an action against an oil company.
That action was settled and a release executed.

The court act1c

against the oil company was "fully compromised and settled" and
that action dismissed with prejudice.

Ten months later plaint1f·

brought a suit for the same injuries against a physician for
malpractice, and the court held at page 65:
"The appellant, not having responded to facts properly
demanded under the rules, but preferring to argue about the
elusive factor of intent in signing the full, complete,
unreserved release of all claims, hardly can pursue a claim
years later without substantial and meaningful reason."
(Emphasis added.)

It is thur clear that having failed to reserve his
rights against the doctor in the Williams case, the same were lM:
to the plaintiff.
In Greenhalch v. Shell Oil Co.,
1935), a case applying Utah law,

78 Fed 2d 942

ClO Cir.

the injured plaintiff executed ar

agreement releasing and discharging one obligor, and the agreement
contained a reservation of rights which would still permit him
sue "any physician or surgeon for malpractice or neglect."

t0

The

court there recognized plaintiff's right under the Act to make
such a reservation and the court held that in a later suit aga 1 ·''
Shell Oil Co. the prior release operated as an absolute defense
The court stated at page 945 as follows:
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"There being no written reservation of right against
defendant, as provided in section 4, we conclude that the
release given discharged defendant from liability, if any,
for plantiff's fall."
We also cite to the court the case of Mills v. Standard
'.i~le,

"~age

577 P2d 756, a 1978 Colorado case,

where the court held

759:

"Here, if Standard were not released, then the estate
would be liable on the indemnity agreement for damages later
recovered by Mills against Standard.
Obviously, that was not
the intent of the release issued to the estate.
We agree
with the view that the objective circumstances were not
sufficient to indicate an intention not to release Standard."
(Emphasis added.)
In Sims v.Western Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 818 ClOthCir.
_377 I a release of a direct infringer of patent also operated to
·elease the party which allegedly induced the infringement, since
:he release did not contain any reservation of rights against the

second party.

In Matland v. U.S.,
:.\e release of

285 F.2d 752, 755 <3rd Cir. 1961)

an airline by the surviving spouse of a passenger

(.\led in a collision released the United States from a
based upon the alleged negligence of its employees,

claim

since the

sectlement agreement with the airline did not include reservation
;frights against the United States.
Thus, a review of the cases in which these statutes have
_,"" applied indicates that the courts strictly construe these
''atutes to release from liability a co-obliger against whom an
:tJ1gee does not make an express reservation of rights in a
settlement agreement with another co-obliger.
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In none of the

cases in which Section 15-4-4 has been applied did a court, on
•equitable" or other grounds, refuse to find that a settlement
agreement in which an obligee released one co-obligor from
liability failed to discharge another co-obligor against whom nc
express reservation of rights had been made in the settlement
agreement.

Neither did a court, in any of these cases, look

outside the terms of the settlement agreement to find

reservati~

of rights against a co-obligor, or that, notwithstanding the
express terms of the settlement agreement, a party intended to
reserve its rights against another and that, therefore, an expres
reservation of rights should be read into the settlement agreYer·
on "equitable" grounds.
Although a mortgage foreclosure action is equitable
nature, that very fact militates against PCA.

in

It is a well-

established maxim that equity will not lend its aid to assist a
party in achieving an unfair or inequitable purpose.
It must be clear to every fair-minded person that
Gregory ought in good conscience to have paid the entire debt to
PCA because he assumed for a valuable consideration the original
debt and because all subsequent disbursements went to him.

Not

only does PCA make no effort to bring about that result, or eve11
assist therein, but it actually takes the unbelievable step of
releasing Gregory from the entire secured debt.

In so doing PO

is saying in effect that it has no need to pursue equity.

It

15

saying that, although you, Dr. Gregory, got the money from us,~
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make Watts pay the bill in its entirety.
2

PCA has

i 1 berately and with cold and calculated purpose chosen to ignore

,, '~' . _ y .
PCA sought to lay a snare for Watts and make them pay
.ith their
~--3...~~·

home and everything they have for that which they did

and instead it complains that is has ensnarred itself.
Having failed to do equity, it can scarcely seek it

1ere.
In the instant case.

if the Watts are not released, then

:,regorys have achieved nothing by virtue of the aforesaid
Settlement Agreement with PCA because they are still subject to
SJ! t

by Wat ts, and it is clear that Gregorys did not enter into an

agreement which would yield them no benefit whatsoever.
PCA urges special significance to the language in the
Settlement Agreement that PCA and Gregorys will "work together to
conclude the litigation between them and Watts."

If Watts are not

·eteased, however, by the Settlement Agreement, how can PCA help
Gi egory in the Crossclaim of Watts against Gregory?

:,, get as large a

PCA would try

judgment as it could against Watts, and Watts

•ill then be entitled to that same large judgment against
~regorys.

How does that help Gregory?

:,, e3ory help PCA?

Furthermore, how can

If Watts is not released from liability,

it

: be in the best interests of Gregory to work to keep any PCA
" 1>iinPnt

small.

No doubt Gregory felt that in signing the

)ettlement Agreement he was concluding the litigation as to Watts.
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PCA has urged that the existence of the suit is an
express reservation.

Under Section 15-4-4 the express reservat:·

must be "in writing and as part of the same transaction as the
release."

The suit was filed years before and is not a part of

the same transaction.

Whether suit has been filed or not, the:

obligors are such because of certain conduct or a contract
existing before the suit.

Settlement of that conduct or contract

is the same, whether or not the suit exists--only the mechanics
may be different.
PCA sets out a quotation from Anderson, Uniform
Commercial Code, Vol. 2, page 131, Section 3-601:11.
found at page 20 of appellant's brief.

This is

<This language is now

found in Volume 3 of the Second Edition at page 131, Section 3·
606:11.J

The author in support of his statement that "other

circumstances of the transaction" may disclose the reservation
cites only one case, Parnes v. Celia's, Inc., 99 New Jer. Sup.
179, 239 Atl.2d 19.

In that case the reservation was in the

contractual documents (exchange of letters) and was an express
reservation.

It is therefore no authority for the proposition

that circumstances may show an express reservation.

It is true

that the Uniform Commercial Code Section (70A-3-606) does not
require a writing, but Section 15-4-4 does require a writing, an.c
thus even if circumstances could show a reservation under the uc:
provision, they cannot show the same under Section 15-4-4.
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PCA's efforts at construction of the Settlement
Aqreement in an attempt to make what is at best inference and
rise to the measure of express language, regardless of

:~plication
~ow

it tries to torture the language of its own choosing in that

~ttlement

Agreement, there is not by any reasonable rendering "an

express reservation of rights" against the Watts.
~lieved

If PCA has

that it could release all liability on the notes and

still proceed on the collateral, it has made an erroneous decision
to the law, which clearly provides that release of the debt
1
releases the collateral.
In this connection it should also be

u

noted that in paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement Gregory is
oeing released from the notes and from the "Mortgage."
PCA had the opportunity and indeed the duty to obtain
from Gregory his collateral in the form of Arizona land to secure
lor pay) the entire PCA debt, which was rightfully his debt.
Instead of doing that, PCA has actually taken an assignment of the
entire Arizona collateral (which at the time of the Settlement
Agreement was in the form of a contract receivable providing for
~ayment

to Gregorys of the sum of $283,961.38 secured by a trust

jeed on said Arizona land) as security for PCA' s unsecured debt of
;pproximately $30,000.00.

(R.281,282)

PCA has therefore released

.•regorys of all liability on the notes and entered into
~chinations

designed to allow Gregorys to retain all but about

))0,000.00 of the Arizona collateral, being a net amount of about
<8$253,000.00, and after all of that asserts the right to require
)j

Am Jur 2d, Mortgages, Section 394.
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Watts to pay the whole debt.

That, we respectfully submit,

is

not equity.
POINT III.

NUMEROUS FACTUAL

ISSUES EXIST RELATl'..

TO THE CLAIM OF PCA WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN ITS FAVOi.

EVEN IF WATTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The thrust of PCA's Point V is that it is entitled tn
summary judgment.

We believe that the foregoing arguments as

contained in this brief show that Watts were entitled to summary

:i

judgment. However, even if Watts were not entitled to said sumrna:

.J

judgment, there would still remain in the action a multitude of
factual issues raised in the lower court regarding PCA' s claims

J:I

which would have to be tried,

idc

1.

including at least the following:

Were the increases in the loans made upon the

representation that substitute collateral would be obtained?
2.

The three promissory notes signed by the Watts as

accommodation makers as they now appear bear a stamp imprint

:2l
'~
:~a

thereon purporting to render them secured by the original
mortgage.

Watts assert that said stamps were placed thereon af'.·

they were signed.

Is that the fact and,

if so, were they inten'.· ! 0

to be collateralized by the substitute collateral belonging to
Gregory?
3.

Was the security agreement intended to include

cattle of Watts? or of Gregory? or did it.relate to crops only
contained in the printed portions, since it was signed in
Was it signed in blank?
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blan~

t

4.

Would Watts be chargeable with expenditures on the

made for purposes not related to the farm,

1 c,s

such as expenses

'r12ona and payments to Watts themselves on the Uniform Real
.ate Contract?
5.
30 anJoning

Having undertaken to run the farm, and thereafter

that undertaking, did PCA properly mitigate damages?
6.

Watts assert that during the time PCA operated the

:nm I after corrunencement of

this action)

it has failed to account

:Jr the amounts earned by it.

7.
~tpe

Did an impairment of collateral take place when

purchased for use on the farm for $38,000.00 and constituting

;jd1tional collateral, was sold for $7,500.00?
8.

Watts assert that PCA hindered efforts of Watts to

:'ell the farm and have, among other things,
et PCA to

(See R.303-306)

instructed personnel

inform prospective buyers inquiring about the property

:\at it was unavailable, have failed and refused to disclose
:~'ormation
~A

concerning the farm to interested parties, and that

has sought to hinder efforts of sale to force the property to

JC to sheriff's

sale in an attempt to obtain all of the Watts'

"rnd for a depressed and devalued pr ice.
9.
:~e

What is the balance owing,

above issues?

10.

The affidavits of the Watts stand in opposition to

affidavits of Thad Allen.
'C

if any, after resolution

The weight to be given would be for

:ourt sitting as a fact finder .

.. 4 9-

The trial court found on page 3 of the Summar 1
Judgment (R.402) with regard to PCA's Motion for S'..1mmar1· Judac'
that:
"Issues of fact
thereof, but further
of the Watts' Motion
litigation as to the

exist which preclude the granting
finds and determines that the gran::· '
for Summary Judgment disposes of :.r:o
plaintiff."

We respectfully submit that the trial court was ent::,
correct in so ruling.
CONCLUSION
The Watts have taken nothing from PCA.
the trial court has taken nothing from PCA.
up its rights.

de~1s1on

PCA vol'..lnatrily

There just is no "express reservation."

has been no unjust enrichment of Watts.
money;

The

they were accommodation makers.

~~

Th~•

Watts didn't get tne
As noted oy Mr. Boyer,

PCA's own employee, Watts were "innocent victims" of these loao'
If anyone has been unjustly enriched,

it

is Gregorys--out th1s ·

voluntarily agreed to do.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

~~~c-.'~
~Vv~7~
~.:;. 6
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GORDON A. !'l.ADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS

~~ ~
'-
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